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“WE ARE ALL TEXTUALISTS NOW”:  THE 
LEGACY OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
 
REMARKS OF 
JUDGE DIARMUID F. O’SCANNLAIN† 
 
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2017 
ST. JOHN’S UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
QUEENS, N.Y. 
One of my favorite extra-judicial activities is meeting with 
law students, and it is a pleasure to be with you today.  But it is 
a special privilege to come back to the Jamaica campus of St. 
John’s College from which I graduated 60 years ago, long before 
the Law School had moved here from Schermerhorn Street in 
Brooklyn, and when there was only one building on this former 
golf course. 
I was honored to call Justice Scalia a role model and friend.  
What I hope to convey to you today, however, is the effect Justice 
Scalia’s tenure on the United States Supreme Court had on the 
Court itself, other judges, and ultimately, the rule of law. 
 
† United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit; B.A., St. John’s University, 1957; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1963; LL.M., 
University of Virginia, 1992; LL.D. (Hon.), University of Notre Dame, 2002; LL.D. 
(Hon.), Lewis & Clark College, 2003; LL.D. (Hon.), University of Portland, 2011. The 
views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect the view of my 
colleagues or of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I wish to 
acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of Jessica Wagner, William Lane, and 
Sumeet Dang, my law clerks, in preparing these remarks. 
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I 
Two years ago, during the Antonin Scalia Lecture series at 
Harvard, Justice Elena Kagan declared “we’re all textualists 
now.”1  To the more recent members of the bar, Justice Kagan’s 
words may not seem terribly profound—of course any competent 
lawyer knows that when construing a statute one begins with the 
text.  I can assure you, however, that this was not always the 
case.  For those of us who remember a time before Scalia, Justice 
Kagan’s statement is a testament to the sea change the law has 
undergone in recent decades. 
Indeed, in the same speech, Justice Kagan explained that if 
someone had mentioned “statutory interpretation” to her while 
she was in law school, she was not sure she “would even quite 
have known what that meant.”  In those days, statutory 
interpretation “was not really taught as a discipline.”2  Such were 
the Dark Ages. 
For decades, law schools, the Supreme Court, and the legal 
profession as a whole had been hostile to conservative legal 
thought.  This was true in 1963 when I graduated from law 
school during the heyday of the Warren Court, and it was still 
true when Justice Kagan graduated from law school in 1986—the 
very same year that Justice Scalia joined the high Court, and I 
joined the Ninth Circuit.  In fact, my commission was signed by 
President Reagan on September 26, 1986—the very same day 
Judge Scalia became Justice Scalia. 
At that time, as Justice Kagan explained, the approach was 
“what should this statute be,” rather than what do “the words on 
the paper say.”3  Our law schools made common law lawyers of 
future judges, who believed it was the role of the judiciary to 
make law, not merely to interpret it, as Justice Scalia famously 
observed in his book: A Matter of Interpretation.4  To quote  
 
 
1 Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with 
Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015) 
[hereinafter Scalia Lecture Series] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1997). 
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Justice Kagan, the entire judicial endeavor was “policy-oriented” 
with judges and law students alike “pretending to be 
congressmen.”5 
Such was the legacy of the legal realists and their 
intellectual heirs, who argued that judges do not in fact decide 
cases in accord with the law—not because judges are willful or 
incompetent, but because the law itself is radically 
indeterminate.  This thinking laid the groundwork for the rise of 
the so-called purposivist school.  According to such thinkers, 
every law had a purpose aimed at addressing some societal need.  
It was the task of the judge to serve as the legislature’s partner 
to ensure that such purposes were carried out.  This mindset 
empowered judges to break free from the bonds of statutory text 
to ensure that a preferred public policy was achieved. 
And so when it came to applying the law, judges were, for 
the most part, guided by policy—not text.  These common law 
judges felt comfortable going beyond the text of the Constitution 
to resolve a large number of questions that were previously left to 
the other branches or to the states.  Whether it was policing the 
equality of congressional districts or scrutinizing Congress’ 
exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority, 
courts felt empowered to involve themselves in an expanding 
array of constitutionally significant disputes.  The late Justice 
William Brennan used to hold up one hand, fingers spread, to 
illustrate what he called the most important rule in 
constitutional law: the Rule of Five.  With five votes, a Justice 
can do anything.  Needless to say, the original understanding of 
our founding document carried little weight. 
Of course all this was precisely the approach to judging that 
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78 had warned against when 
he wrote that “The courts must declare the sense of the law; and 
if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, 
the consequence would equally be the substitution of their 
pleasure to that of the legislative body.”6 
Yet, in 1986, to ask what the founding generation may have 
thought about a question of constitutional interpretation was to 
identify oneself as an outlier, even a pariah—a fringe legal 
thinker not competent to serve on the bench.  Indeed, one need 
 
5 Scalia Lecture Series, supra note 1. 
6 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Yale Univ. Press ed. 
2009). 
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only reflect upon the treatment of Robert Bork to understand 
what an originalist could come to expect if his views were known.  
For judges who believed that Hamilton had gotten it right, these 
were dark days. 
II 
Fortunately for all of us, however, Justice Scalia slipped 
miraculously through the confirmation process, though at least 
one commentator later argued that his record prior to joining the 
Supreme Court “was ‘worse’ than Bork.”7  With the elevation of 
Justice Scalia, judges who had once risked losing their credibility 
for embracing originalism now had an advocate on the high 
court.  Justice Scalia gave us top cover—he paved the way for 
judges like me to embrace openly a traditional view of judging 
that advocated a limited role for the courts.  Through his force of 
reason, biting wit, and powerful pen, Justice Scalia made 
textualism and originalism respected schools of thought. 
But Justice Scalia’s presence on the Court did more than just 
provide encouragement—it changed minds.  In the words of 
Justice Kagan, Justice Scalia “taught everybody how to do 
statutory interpretation differently.”  Today, we are all 
textualists, she said, “in a way that was not remotely true when 
Justice Scalia joined the bench.”8 
Indeed, the most powerful testament to the way Justice 
Scalia changed the conversation is how liberals and 
conservatives alike now employ the rhetoric of textualism and 
originalism.  Such is emphasized in Justice Kagan’s comments at 
Harvard, where she explained 
[W]hen judges confront a statutory text, they’re not the writers 
of that text; they shouldn’t be able to rewrite that text.  There is 
a text that somebody . . . has put in front of them, and . . . what 
you do with that text is a very different enterprise than the 
enterprise that Congress . . . has undertaken in writing that 
text.9   
And, this is coming from an Obama-appointed Supreme Court 
justice! 
 
7 David A. Kaplan, Opinion, Scalia Was ‘Worse’ than Bork, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 
1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/19/opinion/scalia-was-worse-than-bork.html. 
8 Scalia Lecture Series, supra note 1. 
9 Id. 
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More importantly, this focus on the actual text is exemplified 
in recent Supreme Court opinions.  In Yates v. United States,10 
the Court considered whether a section of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act that criminalizes evidence-tampering could be applied to a 
commercial fisherman who caught undersized red grouper in 
U.S.-controlled waters in the Gulf of Mexico.11  After being issued 
a citation by a fisheries officer, the fisherman had the evidence—
his catch—thrown back into the sea, rather than bringing it to 
port as ordered by the officer.  A plurality opinion written by 
Justice Ginsburg relied on the statutory context to conclude that 
Section 1519 applied only to “objects one can use to record or 
preserve information,” such as disk drives, not all objects in the 
physical world.  Such a reading confined the application of the 
statute to situations closer to what the plurality thought the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was designed to cover—“fraud in financial 
record-keeping.”12  In this way, the plurality attempted to 
implement what it perceived as the will of Congress—the pre-
Scalia method of interpretation. 
Yet, Justice Kagan wrote a notable dissent, joined by 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, in which she began with 
the “text” of the statute, which “prohibits tampering with ‘any 
record, document, or tangible object’ in an attempt to obstruct a 
federal investigation.”13  Famously citing Dr. Seuss’s One Fish 
Two Fish Red Fish Blue Fish, Justice Kagan argued that the “the 
ordinary meaning of ‘tangible object’ is ‘a discrete thing that 
possesses physical form,’ ” as even the plurality opinion written 
by Justice Ginsburg had acknowledged.14  Thus, according to 
Justice Kagan, “tangible object” plainly covered fish, 
notwithstanding the plurality’s attempts at discernment. 
Justice Alito wrote a separate opinion concurring with the 
plurality.  He applied the statutory canons of noscitur a sociis 
and ejusdem generis to argue that “tangible object” should be 
limited to something “similar to records or documents.”15 
 
 
10 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (plurality opinion). 
11 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012). 
12 Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1087 (Ginsburg, J., plurality). 
13 Id. at 1090 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)). 
14 Id. at 1091 (quoting id. at 1081 (Ginsburg, J., plurality)). 
15 Id. at 1089 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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As Yates illustrates, Justice Scalia’s focus on the plain 
meaning of a text may not always win the day, but such approach 
can shake up the traditional divide between liberals and 
conservatives.  Justice Ginsburg was forced to acknowledge the 
textualist arguments in Justice Kagan’s dissent and responded 
by using statutory canons of interpretations to bolster her 
broader reliance on legislative context.  Justice Alito likewise 
employed statutory canons—a textualist tool—in his 
concurrence.  Textualism has changed the conversation. 
Indeed, when divisive political issues are not at stake, the 
Supreme Court frequently adopts a textualist approach.  A recent 
example is Lockhart v. United States,16 the very first opinion that 
the Court issued after Justice Scalia’s death.  At issue was a 
provision which adds a sentencing enhancement for prior 
convictions “under the laws of any State relating to aggravated 
sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a 
minor or ward. . . .”17  The question was whether the phrase 
“involving a minor or ward” applied to all three preceding 
categories of convictions, or merely the last one, “abusive sexual 
conduct.”  The majority, with Justice Sotomayor writing, 
carefully parsed the text and determined that the canon of 
construction known as the rule of the last antecedent dictated 
that the phrase “involving a minor or word” modified only the 
last category of conviction in the list, “abusive sexual conduct.” 
Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a dissent 
arguing that the rule of the last antecedent was overcome by 
another rule of construction which held that a modifier at the end 
of the list generally applies to the entire series, if the series has 
“a straightforward, parallel construction.”18  Thus, Kagan 
contended that “involving a minor or ward” should apply to all 
three categories of convictions.  Both the majority and dissent 
cited opinions written by Justice Scalia to support their 
respective contentions, in addition to that New Bible of statutory 
interpretation, the 2012 book by Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner 
entitled Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts.  In other  
 
 
16 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016). 
17 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) (2012). 
18 Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 970 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA 
& BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 147 
(2012)). 
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words, in Lockhart Justices Sotomayor and Kagan literally were 
quoting Scalia back and forth at each other.  This is a stark 
change from 1986. 
Justice Scalia reoriented the Court not only toward 
textualism, but also its close cousin, originalism, which is merely 
textualism applied to constitutional interpretation.  Justice 
Scalia’s contributions to originalism cannot be underestimated.  
More than anyone else, he made originalism a respected means 
of analysis.  With his emphasis on original public meaning, 
rather than what went on in the heads of the Founders, Justice 
Scalia answered many of the critiques that had been made of the 
earlier form of originalism, original intent.  His repeated 
application of originalist analysis forced other justices to respond 
and even to reevaluate their own positions. 
Although other justices may employ originalism less 
frequently than textualism—constitutional questions are more 
likely than statutory questions to have significant political 
implications—still, the more liberal members of the Court have 
begun couching some of their arguments in originalist terms. 
Perhaps the most famous example of this is District of 
Columbia v. Heller.19  In that case Justice Scalia wrote a majority 
opinion that conducted an extensive review of history and 
tradition to conclude that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual right to bear arms.  Justice Scalia’s opinion is a model 
of the originalist method.  Yet perhaps the most surprising thing 
about Heller was that Justice Stevens’s dissent also employed 
history and text to reach the opposite conclusion—the Second 
Amendment only protected the right of militia members to bear 
arms.  Indeed, Justice Stevens conducted a point-by-point 
refutation of Justice Scalia’s reliance on the English Bill of 
Rights, Blackstone’s Commentaries, and similar sources.  There 
was a similar, though less extensive, discussion about history on 
the part of the liberal justices who dissented in the follow-on case 
of McDonald v. City of Chicago.20  Regardless of whether you 
agree with the dissenters’ analyses in these cases, fights over 
history and text are very different from fights about naked policy 
preferences. 
 
19 554 U.S. 570, 575 (2008). 
20 561 U.S. 742 (2010). See, e.g., id. at 931–38 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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A more recent example is the Court’s 2016 decision in 
Evenwel v. Abbott,21 which also was issued after Justice Scalia’s 
death.  The question was whether states could draw legislative 
districts on the basis of total population rather than the basis of 
eligible-voter population under the Equal Protection clause.  
Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion of the Court,22 concluding 
that it was permissible for states to draw districts on the basis of 
total population.  She began with “constitutional history,” 
discussing the Founders and quoting the Federalist Papers, and 
then proceeded to outline the background of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, before turning to past Supreme Court precedent 
and settled practice.23  Regardless of whether one agrees wholly 
with her analysis, Justice Ginsburg’s decision to start with 
constitutional history is a marked departure from many of the 
Court’s past precedents.  For example, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion 
in United States v. Virginia,24 the all-male Virginia Military 
Academy case also involving the Equal Protection clause, never 
considered an original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Some might contend that in cases like Heller and Evenwel, 
liberal justices were employing history merely to attempt to win 
over the Court’s more conservative wing, not because they were 
actually persuaded by originalist arguments.  Even if this were 
true, these opinions still represent a significant change.  It is far 
better to be debating text and history than to be discussing the 
latest social science research in the manner of Brandeis Briefs.  
The Court’s attention to text and history forces the rest of the 
legal world—lower court judges, academics, and law students—to 
evaluate these types of arguments.  It demonstrates that these 
arguments are respected and provides further justification for 
judges like myself to use them in persuading our own colleagues. 
Witnessing such developments from a level below, judges 
like myself who share Justice Scalia’s judicial philosophy have 
gained confidence that our approach to the law—the limited 
approach advocated by Hamilton—is no longer viewed with 
disdain.  Indeed, sometimes we even have been vindicated.  
 
21 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016). 
22 Note that Justice Thomas and Justice Alito wrote concurring opinions. 
23 Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1127–32. 
24 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
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Washington v. Glucksberg,25 for example, was a case in which a 
majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit sitting in limited en banc invoked the doctrine of 
substantive due process to strike down as unconstitutional a 
state ban on physician-assisted suicide as applied to terminally 
ill adults.  I dissented to the denial of a full-court en banc 
rehearing as I believed that the Due Process Clause could not 
possibly be construed so as to guarantee a right to suicide.26  
Borrowing the words of Justice Frankfurter, I reminded the court 
that “[o]ur duty to abstain from confounding policy with 
constitutionality demands perceptive humility as well as self-
restraint in not declaring unconstitutional what in a judge’s 
private judgment is deemed unwise and even dangerous.”27  The 
Supreme Court reversed the limited en banc court 
unanimously.28 
III 
Nonetheless, just last year, many worried that if 
conservatives lost a majority on the Court because of the death of 
Justice Scalia, reversals like Glucksberg would no longer occur.  
Their fear was that without Justice Scalia, other justices would 
be less likely to continue employing textualist and originalist 
approaches.  But with Justice Gorsuch now in Scalia’s seat, their 
worries have subsided, at least for the time being.  In any event, 
while counting to five is always a concern, I am not persuaded 
that other justices began using text and history only for sophist 
ends, applying the method while ignoring the force of Justice 
Scalia’s reasoning. 
It has been said that people reveal their true character in the 
actions taken when no one is looking.29  I find it especially telling 
that the Court is most likely to apply textualism when there are 
fewer people watching—when the political stakes are low.  I 
submit that the Court routinely follows the text in low-stake 
situations because textualism is the essence of judicial review.  
 
25 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
26 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997). 
27 Id. at 1446. 
28 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 709. 
29 “The true test of a man’s character is what he does when no one is watching,” 
attributed to John Wooden, the legendary basketball coach. 
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Judges are given texts, whether in the form of statutes or the 
Constitution, and asked to apply them to concrete situations.  In 
the words of Blackstone, a judge is “not delegated to pronounce a 
new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.”30  As Justice 
Scalia repeatedly proclaimed, our job is not to make the law; it is 
to apply the law as already written. 
Textualism is straightforward.  It takes significant mental 
gymnastics to conjure away the meaning of a clear text, or to find 
a heretofore unknown right in the penumbras and emanations of 
the Constitution.  Textualism is not always easy, but the method 
is plain:  Take a text, look to the common definitions of the words 
at the time the text was enacted, and apply canons of 
construction.  In some cases, this can be hard work and involve 
significant research.  It is not glamorous, but it is the standard 
stuff of lawyering. 
Textualism is not only straightforward, it is also fair.  After 
Justice Scalia joined the high court, various commentators noted, 
with surprise, that he did not always side with the so-called 
conservative wing of the bench.  Indeed, some of the most 
fascinating lineups occurred when Justice Scalia joined the more 
liberal side of the Court, which was not uncommon in the First 
and Fourth Amendment contexts. 
For example, in Maryland v. King,31 Scalia wrote a dissent 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan concluding 
that the Fourth Amendment barred the suspicionless collection of 
DNA.  In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,32 Justice 
Scalia wrote the majority opinion of the Court, joined by Justices 
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, striking down a 
California law that banned the sale of violent video games to 
minors.  And, in Texas v. Johnson,33 Justice Scalia provided the 
crucial fifth vote holding that states could not prohibit flag 
burning.  Now, one might disagree with Justice Scalia’s 
application of originalism in these cases, as Justice Thomas and 
others have, but the crucial point is that textualism does not 
necessarily cut in a liberal or conservative direction.  Indeed, 
Justice Scalia would have been the first to tell you—and in fact, 
stated publicly on multiple occasions—that the end result of his 
 
30 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69. 
31 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
32 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
33 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
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application of textualism and originalism did not always align 
with his own policy preferences.  Instead, textualism follows “We 
the people.” 
Whether one is liberal or conservative, it may be tempting to 
heed the siren call to apply one’s own conceptions of what the law 
should be.  Yet, as Justice Scalia emphasized, to do so would 
substitute our will for the will of the people acting through their 
elected representatives.  It would take “We the People” and 
replace it with “We the judges.”  While some judges might be 
surprised to learn this, we are not enlightened philosopher-kings, 
and we are certainly not congressmen, as Justice Scalia 
admonished us on more than one occasion.34 
IV 
In sum, Justice Scalia not only made textualism and 
originalism respected—even mainstream—as the opinions of his 
colleagues in cases like Yates, Lockhart, Heller, and Evenwel 
demonstrate, but he reminded us anew of the fundamental role of 
judges—to uphold the rule of law, not to enact our personal policy 
preferences.  Such will be his greatest legacy. 
And, as Justice Kagan observed, “the truth of the matter is 
[that if] you wake up in 100 years . . . most people are not going 
to know most of our names,” but that is “not the case with Justice 
Scalia.”35 





34 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (“We have repeatedly 
told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established 
law at a high level of generality.”). 
35 Scalia Lecture Series, supra note 1. 
